This phase leads to the system readiness phase, whereby the target is essentially checked for all known vulnerabilities. The readiness phase culminates in the reporting phase, where the findings are classified into categories of high, medium, and low risk; and methods for improving the security or mitigating the risk of vulnerability of the target are discussed If you were to perform a vulnerability assessment of your home, you would likely check each door to your home to see if they are closed and locked.
You would also check every window, making sure that they closed completely and latch correctly. This same concept applies to systems, networks, and electronic data. Malicious users are the thieves and vandals of your data. Focus on their tools, mentality, and motivations, and you can then react swiftly to their actions. Defining assessment and testing Vulnerability assessments may be broken down into one of two types: outside looking in and inside looking around.
You see what a cracker sees — publicly-routable IP addresses, systems on your DMZ, external interfaces of your firewall, and more. DMZ stands for "demilitarized zone", which corresponds to a computer or small subnetwork that sits between a trusted internal network, such as a corporate private LAN, and an untrusted external network, such as the public Internet. When you perform an inside-looking-around vulnerability assessment, you are at an advantage since you are internal and your status is elevated to trusted.
This is the point of view you and your co-workers have once logged on to your systems. You see print servers, file servers, databases, and other resources. There are striking distinctions between the two types of vulnerability assessments.
Being internal to your company gives you more privileges than an outsider. In most organizations, security is configured to keep intruders out. Very little is done to secure the internals of the organization such as departmental firewalls, user-level access controls, and authentication procedures for internal resources.
Typically, there are many more resources when looking around inside as most systems are internal to a company. Once you are outside the company, your status is untrusted. The systems and resources available to you externally are usually very limited. Consider the difference between vulnerability assessments and penetration tests. Think of a vulnerability assessment as the first step to a penetration test. The information gleaned from the assessment is used for testing.
Whereas the assessment is undertaken to check for holes and potential vulnerabilities, the penetration testing actually attempts to exploit the findings. Assessing network infrastructure is a dynamic process. Security, both information and physical, is dynamic.
Performing an assessment shows an overview, which can turn up false positives and false negatives. A false positive is a result, where the tool finds vulnerabilities which in reality do not exist.
A false negative is when it omits actual vulnerabilities. Security administrators are only as good as the tools they use and the knowledge they retain.
Take any of the assessment tools currently available, run them against your system, and it is almost a guarantee that there are some false positives. Whether by program fault or user error, the result is the same. The tool may find false positives, or, even worse, false negatives. Now that the difference between a vulnerability assessment and a penetration test is defined, take the findings of the assessment and review them carefully before conducting a penetration test as part of your new best practices approach.
Doing so can have adverse effects on productivity and efficiency of your systems and network. The following list examines some of the benefits of performing vulnerability assessments.
Creates proactive focus on information security. Finds potential exploits before crackers find them. Results in systems being kept up to date and patched. Abates financial loss and negative publicity. Establishing a methodology for vulnerability assessment To aid in the selection of tools for a vulnerability assessment, it is helpful to establish a vulnerability assessment methodology.
Unfortunately, there is no predefined or industry approved methodology at this time; however, common sense and best practices can act as a sufficient guide. What is the target? Are we looking at one server, or are we looking at our entire network and everything within the network?
Are we external or internal to the company? The answers to these questions are important as they help determine not only which tools to select but also the manner in which they are used. Vulnerability assessment tools An assessment can start by using some form of an information-gathering tool. When assessing the entire network, map the layout first to find the hosts that are running.
Once located, examine each host individually. Focusing on these hosts requires another set of tools. Knowing which tools to use may be the most crucial step in finding vulnerabilities.
The following tools are just a small sampling of the available tools: Nmap is a popular tool that can be used to find host systems and open ports on those systems. To install Nmap from the AppStream repository, enter the yum install nmap command as the root user. See the nmap 1 man page for more information. The tools from the OpenSCAP suite, such as the oscap command-line utility and the scapworkbench graphical utility, provides a fully automated compliance audit. See Scanning the system for security compliance and vulnerabilities for more information.
Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment AIDE is a utility that creates a database of files on the system, and then uses that database to ensure file integrity and detect system intrusions. Threats to network security Bad practices when configuring the following aspects of a network can increase the risk of an attack. Insecure architectures A misconfigured network is a primary entry point for unauthorized users.
Leaving a trust-based, open local network vulnerable to the highly-insecure Internet is much like leaving a door ajar in a crime-ridden neighborhood — nothing may happen for an arbitrary amount of time, but someone exploits the opportunity eventually.
Simple hardware, such as hubs and routers, relies on the broadcast or non-switched principle; that is, whenever a node transmits data across the network to a recipient node, the hub or router sends a broadcast of the data packets until the recipient node receives and processes the data. This method is the most vulnerable to address resolution protocol ARP or media access control MAC address spoofing by both outside intruders and unauthorized users on local hosts.
Centralized servers Another potential networking pitfall is the use of centralized computing. A common cost-cutting measure for many businesses is to consolidate all services to a single powerful machine. This can be convenient as it is easier to manage and costs considerably less than multiple-server configurations. However, a centralized server introduces a single point of failure on the network. If the central server is compromised, it may render the network completely useless or worse, prone to data manipulation or theft.
In these situations, a central server becomes an open door that allows access to the entire network. If a server is compromised, all of its contents may become available for the cracker to steal or manipulate at will.
The following sections detail some of the main issues. Unused services and open ports A full installation of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 contains more than applications and library packages. However, most server administrators do not opt to install every single package in the distribution, preferring instead to install a base installation of packages, including several server applications.
A common occurrence among system administrators is to install the operating system without paying attention to what programs are actually being installed. This can be problematic because unneeded services may be installed, configured with the default settings, and possibly turned on. This can cause unwanted services, such as Telnet, DHCP, or DNS, to run on a server or workstation without the administrator realizing it, which in turn can cause unwanted traffic to the server or even a potential pathway into the system for crackers.
Unpatched services Most server applications that are included in a default installation are solid, thoroughly tested pieces of software. Having been in use in production environments for many years, their code has been thoroughly refined and many of the bugs have been found and fixed. However, there is no such thing as perfect software and there is always room for further refinement.
Moreover, newer software is often not as rigorously tested as one might expect, because of its recent arrival to production environments or because it may not be as popular as other server software. Although these mechanisms are an effective way of alerting the community to security vulnerabilities, it is up to system administrators to patch their systems promptly. This is particularly true because crackers have access to these same vulnerability tracking services and will use the information to crack unpatched systems whenever they can.
Good system administration requires vigilance, constant bug tracking, and proper system maintenance to ensure a more secure computing environment. Inattentive administration 11 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening Administrators who fail to patch their systems are one of the greatest threats to server security. This applies as much to inexperienced administrators as it does to overconfident or amotivated administrators.
Some administrators fail to patch their servers and workstations, while others fail to watch log messages from the system kernel or network traffic. Another common error is when default passwords or keys to services are left unchanged. For example, some databases have default administration passwords because the database developers assume that the system administrator changes these passwords immediately after installation.
If a database administrator fails to change this password, even an inexperienced cracker can use a widely-known default password to gain administrative privileges to the database.
These are only a few examples of how inattentive administration can lead to compromised servers. Inherently insecure services Even the most vigilant organization can fall victim to vulnerabilities if the network services they choose are inherently insecure. For instance, there are many services developed under the assumption that they are used over trusted networks; however, this assumption fails as soon as the service becomes available over the Internet — which is itself inherently untrusted.
One category of insecure network services are those that require unencrypted user names and passwords for authentication. Telnet and FTP are two such services. If packet sniffing software is monitoring traffic between the remote user and such a service user names and passwords can be easily intercepted.
Inherently, such services can also more easily fall prey to what the security industry terms the man-inthe-middle attack. In this type of attack, a cracker redirects network traffic by tricking a cracked name server on the network to point to his machine instead of the intended server.
In this way a cracker can gather administrative passwords and raw data without the server or the user realizing it. Another category of insecure services include network file systems and information services such as NFS or NIS, which are developed explicitly for LAN usage but are, unfortunately, extended to include WANs for remote users.
NFS does not, by default, have any authentication or security mechanisms configured to prevent a cracker from mounting the NFS share and accessing anything contained therein. By default, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is released with all such services turned off. However, since administrators often find themselves forced to use these services, careful configuration is critical.
Threats to workstation and home PC security Workstations and home PCs may not be as prone to attack as networks or servers, but since they often contain sensitive data, such as credit card information, they are targeted by system crackers.
For these reasons, knowing the vulnerabilities of a workstation can save users the headache of reinstalling the operating system, or worse, recovering from data theft. Bad passwords Bad passwords are one of the easiest ways for an attacker to gain access to a system. Even when using secure protocols, such as SSH, a remote user may be vulnerable to certain attacks if they do not keep their client applications updated. Once connected to the server, the attacker can quietly capture any keystrokes and mouse clicks made by the client over the network.
This problem was fixed in the SSH version 2 protocol, but it is up to the user to keep track of what applications have such vulnerabilities and update them as necessary. Key to these common exploits are the explanations of how they are performed and how administrators can properly safeguard their network against such attacks. Table 1. Common exploits Exploit Description Notes Null or default passwords Leaving administrative passwords blank or using a default password set by the product vendor.
This is most common in hardware such as routers and firewalls, but some services that run on Linux can contain default administrator passwords as well though Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 does not ship with them.
Commonly associated with networking hardware such as routers, firewalls, VPNs, and network attached storage NAS appliances. Common in many legacy operating systems, especially those that bundle services such as UNIX and Windows.
Administrators sometimes create privileged user accounts in a rush and leave the password null, creating a perfect entry point for malicious users who discover the account. Default shared keys Secure services sometimes package default security keys for development or evaluation testing purposes. If these keys are left unchanged and are placed in a production environment on the Internet, all users with the same default keys have access to that shared-key resource, and any sensitive information that it contains.
Most common in wireless access points and preconfigured secure server appliances. Eavesdropping Collecting data that passes between two active nodes on a network by eavesdropping on the connection between the two nodes. Remote attacker must have access to a compromised system on a LAN in order to perform such an attack; usually the cracker has used an active attack such as IP spoofing or man-in-the-middle to compromise a system on the LAN.
Preventative measures include services with cryptographic key exchange, one-time passwords, or encrypted authentication to prevent password snooping; strong encryption during transmission is also advised. Even if the HTTP service runs as a nonprivileged user such as "nobody", information such as configuration files and network maps can be read, or the attacker can start a denial of service attack which drains system resources or renders it unavailable to other users. Services sometimes can have vulnerabilities that go unnoticed during development and testing; these vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, where attackers crash a service using arbitrary values that fill the memory buffer of an application, giving the attacker an interactive command prompt from which they may execute arbitrary commands can give complete administrative control to an attacker.
Administrators should make sure that services do not run as the root user, and should stay vigilant of patches and errata updates for applications from vendors or security organizations such as CERT and CVE. Further exploitation can occur if the compromised workstation has administrative privileges on the rest of the network. Workstations and desktops are more prone to exploitation as workers do not have the expertise or experience to prevent or detect a compromise; it is imperative to inform individuals of the risks they are taking when they install unauthorized software or open unsolicited email attachments.
Safeguards can be implemented such that email client software does not automatically open or execute attachments. Additionally, the automatic update of workstation software using Red Hat Network; or other system management services can alleviate the burdens of multiseat security deployments. This forces the resource to become unavailable to legitimate users. The most reported DoS case in the US occurred in Several highly-trafficked commercial and government sites were rendered unavailable by a coordinated ping flood attack using several compromised systems with high bandwidth connections acting as zombies, or redirected broadcast nodes.
Source packets are usually forged as well as rebroadcast , making investigation as to the true source of the attack difficult. Advances in ingress filtering IETF rfc using iptables and Network Intrusion Detection Systems such as snort assist administrators in tracking down and preventing distributed DoS attacks. Configuring your system securely from the beginning makes it easier to implement additional security settings later. The security measures you should take to protect against such attacks depends both on the sensitivity of the information on the workstation and the location of the machine.
For example, if a machine is used in a trade show and contains no sensitive information, then it may not be critical to prevent such attacks. If the workstation is located in a place where only authorized or trusted people have access, however, then securing the BIOS or the boot loader may not be necessary.
This makes it possible for them to enter rescue mode or single user mode, which in turn allows them to start arbitrary processes on the system or copy sensitive data.
When activated, an attacker is forced to enter a password before the BIOS launches the boot loader. For this reason, it is good practice to lock the computer case if possible.
However, consult the manual for the computer or motherboard before attempting to disconnect the CMOS battery. Non-BIOS-based systems security Other systems and architectures use different programs to perform low-level tasks roughly equivalent to those of the BIOS on x86 systems.
The reasons for each are different, and we will address each partition. The boot loader and kernel images that are used to boot your system into Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 are stored in this partition. This partition should not be encrypted.
By using a separate partition there is slightly more protection against data loss. You can also target this partition for frequent backups.
However, if a lot of data floods one of these directories it can consume all of your storage space. For this reason, moving these directories into their own partitions is a good idea. NOTE During the installation process, you have an option to encrypt partitions. You must supply a passphrase.
Because of this, it may not be up-to-date with the latest security fixes and may be vulnerable to certain issues that were fixed only after the system provided by the installation medium was released. When installing a potentially vulnerable operating system, always limit exposure only to the closest necessary network zone. In some cases, a LAN or intranet connection is sufficient while the Internet connection is the riskiest.
To follow the best security practices, choose the closest zone with your repository while installing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 from a network. For example, an organization may implement a policy dictating that a particular database is confidential to the extent that it is only accessible from one or a few specified login accounts in the organization's computing environment.
Nevertheless, this policy may be difficult to enforce when the organization uses an integrated computing system whose resources, which are used to access that database, change frequently over time. In most cases, the compliance of these integrated computing systems should be maintained regardless of how the integrated computing system's configuration changes over time. However, conventional compliance management systems that use static approaches to compliance management often do not scale well to larger systems in which the required configuration for every resource in the integrated computing system is individually specified, and may in some cases, cease to function in a highly configurable integrated computing system where resources can appear and disappear, often in very short time periods, based on workload, service level agreement SLA requirements, and other performance criteria specified for the application.
The compliance management system addresses the problems discussed above with conventional systems among other benefits and solutions. The system includes a compliance management computing device having a compliance management tool , an integrated computing system management application , and a data source As will be described in detail below, the compliance management tool creates a security hardening standard-based object instance that represents an integrated computing system in which the security hardening standard-based object instance includes one or more sub-object instances corresponding to one or more hierarchally arranged sub-systems of the integrated computing system The tool also modifies the security hardening standard-based object instance to include security hardening policies for the security hardening standard-based object instance and its respective sub-object instances so that the resulting security hardening standard-based object instance may be used to determine whether one or more resources in the integrated computing system meet each security hardening policy of a security hardening standard.
In general, the compliance management tool identifies those resources in the integrated computing system that may be associated with each of multiple security hardening policies of an established security hardening standard, and modifies an integrated computing system object instance representing that integrated computing system to form a security hardening-based object instance The security hardening standard-based object instance may then be used to determine whether the configuration of the resources of the integrated computing system adequately meets those security hardening policies The integrated computing system object instance is a logical construct that represents the integrated computing system in an object oriented form.
The integrated computing system object instance provides information about the relationships among the constituent resources of the integrated computing system to enable the tool to adequately assess whether certain security objectives are met for the integrated computing system That is, the object model from which the instance is generated imparts contextual, relationship information about each resource that may be used by the tool to ensure that any applicable compliance rules for each of those resources are adequately met.
Additionally, when the integrated computing system is deployed, the tool may continually monitor the integrated computing system for any changes that have occurred to its configuration, and generate another instance to re-assess whether the modified integrated computing system still meets those security rules given the modified configuration of the integrated computing system These security sub-systems should be programmed in order to ensure the desired security posture is achieved for the integrated computing system.
According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a compliance management system includes a computer-based system to manage security configuration settings for an integrated computing system. Further, a compliance management system operating against an integrated computing system should be aware that it is acting upon an integrated computing system and not simply a group of unrelated components.
In order to achieve this integration, the compliance management system requires integration with the specific object model for an integrated system and must be able to assess the security settings for each of the components and sub-systems within the integrated computing system to determine the appropriateness of each security setting within the context of the integrated system's design requirements.
Additionally, the compliance management system should provide a consistent means for managing the available library of recommended security configuration settings in a logical system that can integrate with the various forms of integrated computing systems for which it will be assessing compliance.
It is this library of recommended security settings which will subsequently produce the security hardening content and data that is required to create a well-formed security checklist for assessing the compliance status for an integrated computing system.
The integrated computing system object instance may be obtained in any suitable manner. In one example, the integrated computing system object instance may be obtained using a discovery process to obtain configuration information from the resources of the integrated computing system and the configuration information processed to create the integrated computing system object instance that represents the configuration of the integrated computing system In another example, the tool may obtain the object instance from another separate system that has generated the integrated computing system object instance independently of the compliance management system Additionally, the integrated computing system object instance may be obtained from a specification of an integrated computing system that has not yet been fabricated.
For example, the tool may receive a specification that defines the configuration of an integrated computing system from a separate integrated computing system design tool, and generate the integrated computing system object instance according to the received specification. Hence, the integrated computing system object instance is effectively defined by the tool , while the various resources e. Additionally, the compliance management tool may generate a new security hardening standard-based object instance or modify an existing security hardening standard-based object instance whenever changes occur in the resources to account for changes in the configuration of the integrated computing system For example, the compliance management tool may receive a message from the integrated computing system management application when a new resource is instantiated and update the security hardening standard-based object instance with compliance policies associated with the newly created or modified resources such that subsequent compliance verification checks may account for the newly created or modified resources The compliance of resources generally refers to verification of the configuration of those resources to ensure certain objectives e.
For example, one compliance policy may include verifying that only certain communication ports that are required for operation of the application are open while verifying that all other communication ports e. The security hardening standard-based object instance stores security hardening policies used to verify compliance of each of the resources in the integrated computing system The security hardening policies may include compliance requirements based on any suitable standard, such as a security hardening standard e.
In one embodiment, the security hardening standard-based object instance may be exported as an extensible markup language XML formatted file that may be used by a third party tool for ensuring compliance of each resource in the integrated computing system against a certain security hardening policies.
For example, the tool may export the security hardening standard-based object instance as an XML formatted file to an integrated computing system management application that verifies each resource in the integrated computing system against the security hardening policies and outputs the results of the verification. In one embodiment, the integrated computing system management application may include a compliance testing engine that receives the security hardening standard-based object instance , and verifies the configuration of the integrated computing system against the compliance policies included in the security hardening standard-based object instance One example of such a tool includes a compliance testing engine as described in U.
In one embodiment, the system may also include a security hardening standard interpreter that may be integrated with and consume information provided by the system For example, the security hardening standard interpreter may input information associated with a security hardening standard e.
Additionally, the security hardening standard interpreter may obtain a security hardening-standard based system object instance , parse the information according to the configuration of the instance , translate any included compliance policies into a form suitable for consumption by a particular security hardening standard, and output the translated compliance information based on the format of that security hardening standard.
As shown, the integrated computing system includes multiple sub-systems that may each have one or more resources Nevertheless, the integrated computing system may include any arrangement and number of resources without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. The resources of the integrated computing system may refer to computing devices, such as hardware computing devices e.
The computing devices may also include other communication devices, such as switches, routers, firewall appliances, or other communication device that facilitates communication among multiple other computing devices. For example, the integrated computing system may include one or more converged infrastructures CIs configured in a cloud computing environment. The integrated computing system may include any arrangement and number of resources The virtual computing environment may be embodied in any computing system that provides bare metal computing devices, where the applications and operating system are executed directly on the compute resources, or on virtualized resources virtual objects executed on one or more physical hosts.
One particular example integrated computing system that is embodied as a converged infrastructure is shown and described herein below with respect to FIGS. The tool generates the security hardening standard-based object instance from an integrated computing system object instance stored in the data source The integrated computing system object instance represents the integrated computing system as a unified entity.
The integrated computing system object instance is created as a specific instance of an integrated computing system object model and reflects the actual configuration information obtained from the integrated computing system While the integrated computing system object model is generic to a wide range of possible configurations and resource types found in integrated computing systems, the integrated computing system object instance is specific to the actual configuration and resource types of a particular integrated computing system The integrated computing system object model may be a class definition e.
The integrated computing system object model may be implemented as a database schema, such as a schema for a SQL database, such that the integrated computing system object instance includes a particular collection of tables and relationships built in accordance with the schema and reflecting the configuration of the resources in the integrated computing system The database implementation may be useful in some instances because it provides the benefit of persistence.
The database implementation allows the integrated computing system object instance to be stored in non-volatile memory e. In a particular example, the integrated computing system object instance may be generated by instantiating a class for the system object and instantiating each of a first set of sub-object classes subordinate to the system object class. Any number of the first sub-object instances can be provided. It is emphasized that the categories represented by the first set of sub-object instances may be considered as logical constructs that form container structures for aggregating underlying physical resources of their respective container and, in some cases, may include logical resources or logical groups of physical resources e.
In some examples, the categories themselves may include aggregate information about underlying resources, such as utilization, health, etc. Generating the integrated computing system object instance may further include instantiating each of a second set of sub-object classes from the integrated computing system object model , to represent underlying physical resources of the integrated computing system in accordance with a second set of sub-object instances For example, sub-classes of the integrated computing system object model corresponding to particular physical resources e.
In some examples, these sub-object instances are similar to the software interfaces provided by the resource providers, but may include additional information and functionality. Also, unlike the software interfaces available from the providers, these second set of sub-object instances fit within and are integrated with the overall integrated computing system object instance In some examples, the software models in the second set of sub-object instances may be generic models that represent respective physical resource types but are not particular to specific vendor makes or models.
For example, a software model for a resource type e. Thus, the sub-object instance for a resource is generated from a generic object class but is customized with particular attribute values such that the resulting software model is specific to the particular resource. The integrated computing system object instance and some, most, or all sub-object instances may be populated with one or more attributes based upon the configuration data obtained for its respective resource According to embodiments of the present disclosure, the tool may modify each sub-object instance to include one or more security hardening policies associated with a security hardening standard.
The tool may process the integrated computing system object instance and each sub-object instance and populate each with certain security hardening policies according to their relevance to the security hardening policies of the security hardening standard. For example, if the security hardening standard specifies a requirement that specifies a minimum amount of random access memory for a certain type of resource, the tool may process the integrated computing system object instance to determine which sub-object instances are of that type, and populate those sub-object instances with security hardening policies as attributes that can later be used to verify compliance of its respective resource against the security hardening policy The integrated computing system object instance can include logical and physical sub-object instances at various e.
Further, any number of storage arrays, or portions thereof, can be grouped in one or more resource pools, which can be represented under the storage category of the integrated computing system object instance as respective logical object instances. The data source stores integrated computing system information , security hardening policies , one or more vendor security hardening guidelines , at least one integrated computing system object model 1 , at least one integrated computing system object instance , and at least one security hardening standard-based object instance The integrated computing system information stores raw configuration information about the integrated computing system , such as a number and type of each resource implemented in the integrated computing system The security hardening policies store information about the security hardening policies of a particular security hardening standard e.
The integrated computing system object model is generic to a wide range of possible configurations and resource types found in integrated computing systems, while integrated computing system object instance is specific to the actual configuration and resource types of a particular integrated computing system The security hardening standard-based object instance generally includes an integrated computing system object instance that has been modified by the compliance management tool to include security hardening policies associated with a particular security hardening standard.
The compliance management computing device and the integrated computing system communicate with one another in any suitable manner, including but not limited to, wired e. In another embodiment, the management computing system and integrated computing system communicate with one another using any suitable protocol or messaging scheme.
Other examples of communication protocols exist. For example, the compliance management computing device and integrated computing system may communicate with one another without the use of a separate and a distinct network. Additionally, other embodiments contemplate that the modules employed by the integrated computing system management application are executed by a computing device configured on the integrated computing system The converged infrastructure may be any type having multiple hosts that each executes one or more virtual objects e.
The hosts of a converged infrastructure are often referred to as compute servers. The particular converged infrastructure as shown includes several sub-systems, such as a data processing sub-system a , a data storage sub-system b , and a switch sub-system c. Nevertheless, it should be understood that other converged infrastructures may include additional, fewer, or different types of sub-systems without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. CIS resources are also referenced in various cybersecurity guides and programs.
Below are a few independent cyber defense and resource guides which mention CIS resources:. About Us Leadership Principles Testimonials. View All Resources. Mapping and Compliance Collaboration Enhances Cybersecurity Compliance At CIS, we believe in collaboration - by working together, we find real solutions for real cybersecurity threats. Industry Frameworks Recognition We are in a multi-framework era where organizations large and small, public and private, are tasked with complying with multiple cybersecurity policy, regulatory and legal frameworks.
First state to pass a law that incentivizes organizations to develop a strong data protection and cybersecurity program. The statute establishes legal protections for organizations that voluntarily adopt certain recognized cybersecurity best practices and implement a written information security program. Kamala D. IA at the National Security Agency offers a selection of tools to assist and educate our clients.
We strive to provide clients and partners a broad range of security options for widely used products. More Tools. Last Reviewed: 21 September
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